In 1924, representatives of the world's leading lightbulb manufacturers convened in Geneva to address what they saw as a troubling commercial problem: their products lasted too long. Bulbs that endured for 2,500 hours or more were, from a revenue standpoint, an obstacle to sustained profit.

The resulting agreement, known as the Phoebus cartel, established a maximum bulb lifespan of 1,000 hours. Manufacturers that exceeded this limit faced financial penalties, while those producing shorter-lived bulbs were rewarded. The cartel coordinated production across borders, dividing global markets and setting technical standards that ensured conformity.

Economists have since debated whether such coordinated lifespan reduction constitutes a net harm to consumers or a rational response to market incentives. The case against is straightforward: consumers paid more over time, replacing bulbs that could have lasted longer. The case for is more subtle: shorter product cycles may have accelerated innovation, driving down costs and expanding access to electric lighting more broadly.

The Phoebus cartel dissolved by the early 1940s, partly due to wartime disruption and partly due to antitrust pressure in the United States. Yet its legacy persists in the economic concept of planned obsolescence — the deliberate design of products to require replacement — which critics argue remains embedded in manufacturing culture to this day.

Contemporary examples are not difficult to find. Smartphone manufacturers have faced regulatory scrutiny for software updates that slow older devices. Printer companies have been accused of programming cartridges to report as empty before they are depleted. In the European Union, right-to-repair legislation introduced in 2024 represents a direct legislative response to what regulators characterise as a systemic pattern.